Detainee’s Harsh Treatment Foiled No Plots
Waterboarding, Rough Interrogation of Abu Zubaida Produced False Leads, Officials
By Peter Finn and Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, March 29, 2009; A01
When CIA officials subjected their first high-value captive, Abu Zubaida, to
waterboarding and other harsh interrogation methods, they were convinced that
they had in their custody an al-Qaeda leader who knew details of operations
yet to be unleashed, and they were facing increasing pressure from the White
House to get those secrets out of him.
The methods succeeded in breaking him, and the stories he told of al-Qaeda
terrorism plots sent CIA officers around the globe chasing leads.
In the end, though, not a single significant plot was foiled as a result of
Abu Zubaida’s tortured confessions, according to former senior government officials
who closely followed the interrogations. Nearly all of the leads attained through
the harsh measures quickly evaporated, while most of the useful information
from Abu Zubaida — chiefly names of al-Qaeda members and associates — was
obtained before waterboarding was introduced, they said.
Moreover, within weeks of his capture, U.S. officials had gained evidence that
made clear they had misjudged Abu Zubaida. President George W. Bush had publicly
described him as “al-Qaeda’s chief of operations,” and other top officials
called him a “trusted associate” of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden
and a major figure in the planning of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
None of that was accurate, the new evidence showed.
Abu Zubaida was not even an official member of al-Qaeda, according to a portrait
of the man that emerges from court documents and interviews with current and
former intelligence, law enforcement and military sources. Rather, he was a
“fixer” for radical Muslim ideologues, and he ended up working directly
with al-Qaeda only after Sept. 11 — and that was because the United States
stood ready to invade Afghanistan.
Abu Zubaida’s case presents the Obama administration with one of its most difficult
decisions as it reviews the files of the 241 detainees still held in the U.S.
military prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Abu Zubaida — a nom de guerre for
the man born Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hussein — was never charged in a military
commission in Guantánamo Bay, but some U.S. officials are pushing to have him
charged now with conspiracy.
The Palestinian, 38 and now in captivity for more than seven years, had alleged
links with Ahmed Ressam, an al-Qaeda member dubbed the “Millennium Bomber”
for his plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on New Year’s Eve 1999.
Jordanian officials tied him to terrorist plots to attack a hotel and Christian
holy sites in their country. And he was involved in discussions, after the Taliban
government fell in Afghanistan, to strike back at the United States, including
with attacks on American soil, according to law enforcement and military sources.
Others in the U.S. government, including CIA officials, fear the consequences
of taking a man into court who was waterboarded on largely false assumptions,
because of the prospect of interrogation methods being revealed in detail and
because of the chance of an acquittal that might set a legal precedent. Instead,
they would prefer to send him to Jordan.
Some U.S. officials remain steadfast in their conclusion that Abu Zubaida possessed,
and gave up, plenty of useful information about al-Qaeda.
“It’s simply wrong to suggest that Abu Zubaida wasn’t intimately involved
with al-Qaeda,” said a U.S. counterterrorism official, speaking on the
condition of anonymity because much about Abu Zubaida remains classified. “He
was one of the terrorist organization’s key facilitators, offered new insights
into how the organization operated, provided critical information on senior
al-Qaeda figures . . . and identified hundreds of al-Qaeda members. How anyone
can minimize that information — some of the best we had at the time on al-Qaeda
— is beyond me.”
Until the attacks on New York and Washington, Abu Zubaida was a committed jihadist
who regarded the United States as an enemy principally because of its support
of Israel. He helped move people in and out of military training camps in Afghanistan,
including some men who were or became members of al-Qaeda, according to interviews
with multiple sources, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. He was widely
known as a kind of travel agent for those seeking such training.
That role, it turned out, would play a part in deciding his fate once in U.S.
hands: Because his name often turned up in intelligence traffic linked to al-Qaeda
transactions, some U.S. intelligence leaders were convinced that Abu Zubaida
was a major figure in the terrorist organization, according to officials engaged
in the discussions at the time.
But Abu Zubaida had strained and limited relations with bin Laden and only
vague knowledge before the Sept. 11 attacks that something was brewing, the
His account was echoed in another U.S. interrogation going on at the same time,
one never previously described publicly.
Noor al-Deen, a Syrian, was a teenager when he was captured along with Abu
Zubaida at a Pakistani safe house. Perhaps because of his youth and agitated
state, he readily answered U.S. questions, officials said, and the questioning
went on for months, first in Pakistan and later in a detention facility in Morocco.
His description of Abu Zubaida was consistent: The older man was a well-known
functionary with links to al-Qaeda, but he knew little detailed information
about the group’s operations.
The counterterrorism official rejected that characterization, saying, “Based
on what he shared during his interrogations, he was certainly aware of many
of al-Qaeda’s activities and operatives.”
One connection Abu Zubaida had with al-Qaeda was a long relationship with Khalid
Sheik Mohammed, the self-proclaimed mastermind behind the Sept. 11 attacks,
officials said. Mohammed had approached Abu Zubaida in the 1990s about finding
financiers to support a suicide mission, involving a small plane, targeting
the World Trade Center. Abu Zubaida declined but told him to try bin Laden,
according to a law enforcement source.
Abu Zubaida quickly told U.S. interrogators of Mohammed and of others he knew
to be in al-Qaeda, and he revealed the plans of the low-level operatives who
fled Afghanistan with him. Some were intent on returning to target American
forces with bombs; others wanted to strike on American soil again, according
to military documents and law enforcement sources.
Such intelligence was significant but not blockbuster material. Frustrated,
the Bush administration ratcheted up the pressure — for the first time approving
the use of increasingly harsh interrogations, including waterboarding.
Such treatment at the hands of the CIA has raised questions among human rights
groups about whether Abu Zubaida is capable of standing trial and how the taint
of torture would affect any prosecution.
The International Committee of the Red Cross said in a confidential report
that the treatment of Abu Zubaida and other, subsequent high-value detainees
while in CIA custody constituted torture. And Abu Zubaida refused to cooperate
with FBI “clean teams” who attempted to re-interview high-value detainees
to build cases uncontaminated by allegations of torture, according to military
“The government doesn’t retreat from who KSM is, and neither does KSM,”
said Joseph Margulies, a professor of law at Northwestern University and one
of Abu Zubaida’s attorneys, using an abbreviation for Mohammed. “With Zubaida,
it’s different. The government seems finally to understand he is not at all
the person they thought he was. But he was tortured. And that’s just a profoundly
embarrassing position for the government to be in.”
His lawyers want the U.S. government to arrange for Abu Zubaida’s transfer
to a country besides Jordan — possibly Saudi Arabia, where he has relatives.
The Justice Department declined repeated requests for comment.
Even before President Obama suspended military commissions at the military
base in Cuba, prosecutors had expunged Abu Zubaida’s name from the charge sheets
of a number of detainees who were captured with him and stood accused of conspiracy
and material support for terrorism.
When they were first charged in 2005, these detainees were accused of conspiring
with Abu Zubaida, and the charge sheets contained numerous references to Abu
Zubaida’s alleged terrorist activities. When the charges were refiled last year,
his name had vanished from the documents.
Abu Zubaida was born in 1971 in Saudi Arabia to a Palestinian father and a
Jordanian mother, according to court papers. In 1991, he moved to Afghanistan
and joined mujaheddin fighting Afghan communists, part of the civil war that
raged after the 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet Union. He was seriously wounded
by shrapnel from a mortar blast in 1992, sustaining head injuries that left
him with severe memory problems, which still linger.
In 1994, he became the Pakistan-based coordinator for the Khalden training
camp, outside the Afghan city of Khowst. He directed recruits to the camp and
raised money for it, according to testimony he gave at a March 2007 hearing
in Guantánamo Bay.
The Khalden camp, which provided basic training in small arms, had been in
existence since the war against the Soviets. According to the 9/11 Commission’s
report, Khalden and another camp called Derunta “were not al Qaeda facilities,”
but “Abu Zubaydah had an agreement with Bin Laden to conduct reciprocal
recruiting efforts whereby promising trainees at the camps could be invited
to join al Qaeda.”
Abu Zubaida disputes this, saying he admitted to such a connection with bin
Laden only as the result of torture.
When the Sept. 11 attacks occurred, Abu Zubaida was in Kabul, the Afghan capital.
In anticipation of an American attack, he allied himself with al-Qaeda, he said
at a 2007 hearing, but he soon fled into hiding in Pakistan.
On the night of March 28, 2002, Pakistani and American intelligence officers
raided the Faisalabad safe house where Abu Zubaida had been staying. A firefight
ensued, and Abu Zubaida was captured after jumping from the building’s second
floor. He had been shot three times.
Cowering on the ground floor and also shot was Noor al-Deen, Abu Zubaida’s
19-year-old colleague; one source said that he worshiped the older man as a
hero. Deen was wide-eyed with fear and appeared to believe that he was about
to be executed, remembered John Kiriakou, a former CIA officer who participated
in the raid.
“He was frightened — mostly over what we were going to do with him,”
Kiriakou said. “He had come to the conclusion that his life was over.”
Deen was eventually transferred to Syria, but attempts to firmly establish
his current whereabouts were unsuccessful.
His interrogations corroborated what CIA officials were hearing from Abu Zubaida,
but there were other clues at the time that pointed to a less-than-central role
for the Palestinian. As a veritable travel agent for jihadists, Abu Zubaida
operated in a public world of Internet transactions and ticket agents.
“He was the above-ground support,” said one former Justice Department
official closely involved in the early investigation of Abu Zubaida. “He
was the guy keeping the safe house, and that’s not someone who gets to know
the details of the plans. To make him the mastermind of anything is ridiculous.”
As weeks passed after the capture without significant new confessions, the
Bush White House and some at the CIA became convinced that tougher measures
had to be tried.
The pressure from upper levels of the government was “tremendous,”
driven in part by the routine of daily meetings in which policymakers would
press for updates, one official remembered.
“They couldn’t stand the idea that there wasn’t anything new,” the
official said. “They’d say, ‘You aren’t working hard enough.’ There was
both a disbelief in what he was saying and also a desire for retribution —
a feeling that ‘He’s going to talk, and if he doesn’t talk, we’ll do whatever.’
The application of techniques such as waterboarding — a form of simulated
drowning that U.S. officials had previously deemed a crime — prompted a sudden
torrent of names and facts. Abu Zubaida began unspooling the details of various
al-Qaeda plots, including plans to unleash weapons of mass destruction.
Abu Zubaida’s revelations triggered a series of alerts and sent hundreds of
CIA and FBI investigators scurrying in pursuit of phantoms. The interrogations
led directly to the arrest of Jose Padilla, the man Abu Zubaida identified as
heading an effort to explode a radiological “dirty bomb” in an American
city. Padilla was held in a naval brig for 3 1/2 years on the allegation but
was never charged in any such plot. Every other lead ultimately dissolved into
smoke and shadow, according to high-ranking former U.S. officials with access
to classified reports.
“We spent millions of dollars chasing false alarms,” one former intelligence
Despite the poor results, Bush White House officials and CIA leaders continued
to insist that the harsh measures applied against Abu Zubaida and others produced
useful intelligence that disrupted terrorist plots and saved American lives.
Two weeks ago, Bush’s vice president, Richard B. Cheney, renewed that assertion
in an interview with CNN, saying that “the enhanced interrogation program”
stopped “a great many” terrorist attacks on the level of Sept. 11.
“I’ve seen a report that was written, based upon the intelligence that
we collected then, that itemizes the specific attacks that were stopped by virtue
of what we learned through those programs,” Cheney asserted, adding that
the report is “still classified,” and, “I can’t give you the
details of it without violating classification.”
Since 2006, Senate intelligence committee members have pressed the CIA, in
classified briefings, to provide examples of specific leads that were obtained
from Abu Zubaida through the use of waterboarding and other methods, according
to officials familiar with the requests.
The agency provided none, the officials said.
Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.