Saturday, August 18 2007 - Other Important News
JFK, 9/11 and War
By Dr. Peter Dale Scott
August 18, 2007
In American history there are two types of event: ordinary events which
the information systems of the country can understand and establish.
There are also deep events, or meta-events, which the mainstream
information systems of the country cannot digest. I mean by a “deep
event” an event in which it is clear from the outset that there are
aspects which will not be dealt with in the mainstream media, and will
be studied only by those so-called “conspiracy theorists” who
specialize in deep history.
The events I shall discuss today exhibit continuities with each other
and with other deep events, notably the Iran-Contra affair of the mid
1980s and the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995. But the three I shall
discuss today – the JFK assassination, the initial Watergate break-ins,
and 9/11 – are outstanding in this respect: that while they were
attributed to insignificant and very marginal people, they had
momentous impact, far more than most daily events by more important
people, in redirecting American history. 1
If history is what is recorded, then deep history is the sum of events
which tend to be officially obscured or even suppressed in traditional
books and media. Important recent deep events include the political
assassinations of the 1960s, Watergate, Iran-Contra, and now 9/11. All
these deep events have involved what I call the deep state, that part
of the state which is not publicly accountable, and pursues its goals
by means which will not be approved by a public examination. The CIA
(with its on-going relationships to drug-traffickers) is an obvious
aspect of the deep state, but not the only one, perhaps not even the
dirtiest.
When I talk of a deep state, this term (as opposed to others, like deep
politics), is not my own invention. It is a translation of the Turkish
gizli devlet, or derin devlet, a term used to describe
the networks revealed by the so-called Susurluk incident of 1996, when
the victims traveling together in what became a deadly car crash were
identified as "an MP, a police chief, a beauty queen and her lover, a
top Turkish gangster and hitman called Abdullah Catli.” The giveaway
was that “Catli, a heroin trafficker on Interpol's wanted list, was
carrying a diplomatic passport signed by none other than the Turkish
Interior Minister himself.” 2 He was carrying narcotics with him at
the time of the crash. 3
The study of these deep events has slowly become more respectable in
the almost half-century since the JFK assassination. A major reason has
been the emergence of the Internet and other forms of new media, where
the same deep events tend to get far more extensive treatment. 4 If the new media
come in time to prevail over the priorities of the old, it is possible
that we will see a paradigm shift with respect to what is appropriate
for serious public discourse.
What I have learned over the years is that it is helpful to look at all
these deep events together. This is true for both external reasons (how
the nation and its media handle deep history) and for internal reasons
(the content of deep events themselves).
JFK and 9/ll: Similarities
I gave a talk in November 2006 which by June 2007 had been seen on line
by over 20,000 people. I wish to enlarge three of the comparisons I
made, while beginning with five new ones.
1) Stock market speculation:
By this I am not referring to the dip and recovery that followed both
events, which is common after any unsettling news. 5 I am referring to
the dealings in special stocks which suggested, in both cases, prior
knowledge of what was to come.
In early November 1963, David Harold (“Dry Hole”) Byrd and his
investment partner, James Ling, bought $2 million worth of stock
(132,600 shares) in Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV), Ling’s defense company.
Then in January 1964 LTV received the first defense contract from the
Pentagon – for a fighter plane to be used in the escalating war in
Vietnam. I have calculated that this $2.5 million insiders’ purchase
was worth $26 million by the end of 1967. Moreover the prescient
purchase was about one hundred times the size of any other insider
purchase in aerospace issues in the same period. 6
This does not prove that Byrd and Ling were directly involved in the
Kennedy assassination, but it is likely that Byrd may have had inklings
of what was going to happen. For Byrd owned the Texas School Book
Depository building, where Oswald had been hired as an employee in
October 1963. I have hypothesized that Oswald thought he was there on a
surveillance assignment, to report on a fellow worker was under
investigation by the Dallas Police. Byrd may have been privy to this
arrangement, and have suspected more.
This is comparable to the notorious “puts” purchased in advance in
2001, in the stock of United Airlines and American Airlines. 7 Here too the
advance purchases suggest special knowledge, but here too the
purchasers and the perpetrators may not have been the same, especially
if we imagine that intelligence agencies had prior indications of the
event about to occur.
2) A number of senior officers were out of the country, including
the Secretary of State
On November 22, 1963, six out of ten cabinet members were on their way
to Japan, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Treasury Secretary
Douglas Dillon, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall and Labor Secretary
W.W. Wirtz. 8
On September 11, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell and CJCS Henry
Shelton were traveling outside the country, while Attorney General John
Ashcroft was also traveling. 9 Powell and Shelton were leading
opponents of the Iraq War, and were eventually ousted, along with
Ashcroft.
3) Prior investigations of the eventual suspects were
impeded:
Oswald, who had been on the FBI’s Watch List since his travel to the
Soviet Union in 1959, was inexplicably taken off watch list on October
9, 1963, just after his arrest in New Orleans and his alleged trip to
Mexico City had made him a candidate for increased surveillance.
10 October 9,
the day before the CIA reported to the FBI on Oswald in Mexico City,
was the day CIA HQ itself received the news.
This is comparable to the obstruction by the Radical Fundamentalist
Unit (RFU) at FBI Headquarters of the Minneapolis FBI’s efforts to
interview the so-called twentieth hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui,
especially after Moussaoui’s arrest on August 15, 2001. 11 Moussaoui knew
most of the other nineteen alleged hijackers, and an interview of him,
if not have impeded, could have led to the detention of the nineteen. A
Minnesota Special Agent, Harry Samit, later testified that he wrote FBI
headquarters about seventy memos on Moussaoui between August 16 and
September 11, all to no avail. 12
Similarly the CIA failed to tell the FBI that two of the terrorists,
Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, were in the United States. 13 The blocking of the Moussaoui
investigation, and the withholding of the CIA’s information, have both
been blamed on Janet Reno’s so-called Wall memorandum of 1995. But the
Wall memo was renewed on August 6, 2001, by Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson. 14
Another example of such obstruction was the curtailment of the Army
intelligence investigation of al-Qaeda through its Able Danger program.
According to Paul Thompson’s Terror Timeline, military lawyers on three
occasions forced members of Able Danger to cancel scheduled meetings
with the FBI at the last minute. Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer later
complained that “critical counterterrorism information [was] never
passed from SOCOM [Special Operations Command] to the FBI before 9/11;
this information included the original data regarding Atta and the
terrorist cells in New York and the DC area.” Rep. Curt Weldon (R), who
in 2005 helped bring to light the existence of the program, commented,
“Obviously, if we had taken out that cell, 9/11 would not have
occurred.” 15
Students of the John F. Kennedy assassination have speculated that
Oswald’s name, with or without his knowledge and/or participation, was
being used by the CIA in Mexico as part of a complex operation against
Fidel Castro. 16 If true, the removal of his name
from the FBI watch list would not be absurd, but understandable, to
prevent an accidental law enforcement interruption of a CIA
operation.
In like manner the obstructions of the FBI’s RFU would be
understandable if Atta and Moussaoui or their names were being
used as part of a contemporary intelligence operation. In this case
what looks outwardly like senseless and incoherent behavior would
actually be the result of FBI-CIA coordination. 17
A superficial distinction between the relevant events of 1963 and 2001
actually reinforces this possibility. Marvin Gheesling, the FBI
Supervisor responsible for removing the stop on Oswald’s name, was
later censured by Hoover for his action. Dave Frasca, the RFU chief who
stopped the Minneapolis office from pursuing a criminal warrant against
Moussaoui, was later promoted. 18 The difference is attributable to
Hoover’s personal hostility to the CIA and his irritation with members
of William C. Sullivan’s Intelligence Division of FBI (which included
Gheesling) who were too cooperative with it.
4) Commission recommendations to increase power of intelligence
agencies, or deep state
It is worth pointing out that the Commission Reports prepared with
respect to both JFK and 9/11 were tightly controlled and produced the
same recommendation: that the surveillance powers of intelligence
agencies should be increased. This was quite paradoxical in the case of
the Warren Report, which concluded both that Oswald was a loner and
that the CIA should have greater powers to conduct surveillance of
organized groups. It was hardly less paradoxical in the case of the
9/11 Report, which concluded its survey of repeated intelligence
failures and Pakistani intrigues with recommendations for increased
intelligence budgets and maintenance of current aid to Pakistan. (In
June 2007 Ahmed Rashid blamed the current Pakistani political crisis on
the “bad deal” and “blind bargain” that Washington had made with
Musharraf after 9/11.) 19
A truly independent investigation of each event could, and indeed
should, have been highly embarrassing to the CIA. Even in 2007 the CIA
is still in non-compliance with the Assassination Records Review Act,
and withholding documents with respect to an officer, George Joannides,
who supervised the Cuban Revolutionary Student Directorate, or DRE,
which had recurring contacts with Lee Harvey Oswald. The CIA shared
nothing with the Warren Commission about its contacts with the DRE
(which may have involved Oswald). Nor did the House Select Committee on
Assassinations (HSCA) learn anything of significance in 1978, when the
CIA assigned Joannides to be its Principal Coordinating Officer working
with the House Committee.
Similarly in 2001 the 9/11 Commission learned nothing about why, at the
time of the 9/11 attacks, members of the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) were aloft in a National Emergency
Airborne Command Post (NEACP), or so-called “Doomsday Plane.” 20 Neither in 1964
nor in 2003 was there any chance for such revelations. In 1964 the work
of the Warren Commission was carefully constrained by former CIA
Director Allen Dulles (who had been fired by President Kennedy because
of the Bay of Pigs fiasco). 21 In 2003 the work of the 9/11
Commission, and later the writing of the 9/11 Report, were tightly
controlled by Philip Zelikow, who prior to becoming the Executive
Director of the 9/11 Commission had been appointed by President George
W. Bush to PFIAB.
5) Paper trails laid by the designated suspects to facilitate
their identification:
In both JFK and 9/11, the designated suspects – Oswald and the
hijackers – made their detection easy by implausibly laying paper
trails leading to themselves. Oswald is supposed in March 1963 to have
purchased by mail order, using the name A. Hidell, the notorious
Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, when in Dallas he could have bought a rifle
anonymously by walking a few blocks to a gun shop. 22 In August he
asked to be interviewed by an FBI agent, to whom he showed a
Fair Play for Cuba Committee card with the name A.J. Hidell, which he
had already shown to a New Orleans police lieutenant. The information
was transmitted to the local Office of Naval Intelligence and to the
112th Army Military Intelligence Group. “On November 22, the 112th MIG
file was instrumental, perhaps crucial, in clinching the superficial
case against Oswald as an assassin.” 23
Oswald’s self-incrimination via paper trail was more than matched in
1972 by Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt. The whole unraveling of the
Watergate story by Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and
Carl Bernstein was steered by the abundant evidence, including
cashiers’ checks and easily traceable mint sequential hundred dollar
bills, which Hunt had arranged for prior to the break-in. 24 In case this was
not enough, the burglars took the photographs they made of documents
copied to a commercial photographer in Miami, who promptly
notified the FBI. 25
This irrational self-incrimination via paper trail was again repeated
in 2001 by Mohamed Atta, the principal alleged hijacker. In 2006, “a
former FBI agent [Warren Flagg] and a former federal prosecutor … told
Newsday that one bag found in Boston contained far more than
what the commission report cited, including the names of the hijackers,
their assignments and their al-Qaida connections.” The former
prosecutor added, "These guys left behind a paper trail…. They had bank
accounts. They rented cars. They had to show what they were doing in
the United States.” 26
Atta’s trove of information allegedly “provided the Rosetta stone
enabling FBI agents to swiftly unravel the mystery of who carried out
the suicide attacks and what motivated them.” 27
The belated appearance in 2006 of the Flagg story has caused some to
question it. However, other official allegations point precisely to
other instances of paper trails left by the hijackers. According to the
9/11 Commission Report (532n188), the FBI found an Express Mail
receipt in Nawaf al-Hazmi’s car at Dulles Airport, which led to a
package addressed to Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi. As if this was not
enough, Atta also is said to have left a FedEx waybill for another
package which, the federal indictment of Moussaoui strongly implied,
was collected by al-Hawsawi. 28 The details are given in
Newsweek, November 19, 2001:
The paper trail [Newsweek’s term] that first led investigators
into Ahmed's shadowy financial world began at the bottom of a motel
trash can. On the night of Sept. 10, Atta hunkered down in room 233 at
the Comfort Inn in Portland, Maine. The next morning he would take a
flight to Boston's Logan airport. At the motel, Atta tore up a FedEx
Air Waybill and threw it away. Days later, federal agents searching the
motel found the receipt, from a package mailed in Florida, where Atta
and several other hijackers had lived until days before the bombing. It
was addressed to `Almohtaram,’ Arabic for `The Respected One’ -- the
honorific the terrorists gave to Ahmed. Investigators believe they
sealed the connection when they got hold of the video of Ahmed picking
up the package.
Thus the paper trails laid by both Oswald and Atta were crucial to a
similarity I first discussed in my earlier paper: the speedy
identification of the alleged (or designated) culprits.
6 ) Instant Identification of the Culprits
In the case of Oswald, within fifteen minutes of the assassination and
long before Oswald was picked up in the Texas Theater, the Dallas
police put out on the police network, and possibly other networks, a
description of the killer – five foot ten – 165 pounds, 29] which
exactly matched what was in his FBI file, and in CIA documents about
him. 30
One problem was that this didn’t match the actual height and weight of
the man picked up and charged, which was five foot nine and 140 pounds.
31 The 5’10”
measurement was also suspect because it was attributed to Howard
Brennan, who saw someone in the sixth floor window, but only from the
waist up. Brennan subsequently failed to pick out Oswald in a police
line-up. 32
So there is a question where the police were able to get that exact
measurement of 5’ 10”, 165 pounds. It appears someone had already
determined that Oswald would be the designated culprit, before the
police found him in the Texas Theater.
Meanwhile on 9/11 the FBI already had a list of alleged hijackers by
9:59 am on September 11, which was when the second tower collapsed.
33 9:59 AM
was at least four minutes before Flight United 93 had hit the ground.
Even within the bureaucracy there were suspicions that the FBI was
drawing on pre-9/11 files for its identifications.
"I don't buy the idea that we didn't know what was coming," a former
FBI official with extensive counter-terrorism experience has since
said. "Within 24 hours [of the attack] the Bureau had about 20 people
identified, and photos were sent out to the news media. Obviously this
information was available in the files and somebody was sitting on it."
34
Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer of the Pentagon Able Danger had a similar
reaction:
We were amazed at how quickly the FBI produced the name
and pictures of all 19 hijackers. But then again, we were surprised at
how quickly they’d made the arrests after the first World Trade Center
bombing. Only later did we find out that the FBI had been watching some
of these people for months prior to both incidents.” 35
It was in this context of suspicion that Warren Flagg came forward in
2006 with the explanation of Atta’s paper trail:
"How do you think the government was able to identify
all 19 hijackers almost immediately after the attacks?" Flagg asked.
"They were identified through those papers in the luggage. And that's
how it was known so soon that al-Qaida was behind the hijackings.”
36
It is of course possible that an instantaneous investigation of Atta’s
effects would explain how the FBI could tell Richard Clarke that they
had a list of suspected hijackers by 9:59 AM on September 11. But this
would imply that the FBI had the names of all nineteen hijackers by
then, including the four on Flight 93
which had not yet
crashed.
7) Drug-Traffickers and Deep Events, from the JFK Assassination to
9/11
Pulling back now and looking at the four biggest “deep events” of the
last four decades – the JFK assassination, the Watergate break-ins,
Contragate, and now 9/11 – we see that their common denominator is
drug-trafficking. Why is this? In the first three the
deep state
worked with assets outside civil society and beyond the rule of
law. This is an important hypothesis, so I will repeat it: In the
first three deep events, JFK, the Watergate break-ins, and Contragate,
the
deep state worked with assets outside civil society and beyond
the rule of law.
I want to suggest that in 9/11 the same thing happened again. The
pattern moreover is that exhibited by the
gizli devlet or deep
state in Turkey, where a Parliamentary Investigation into the Susurluk
Report concluded that the deep state had used the drug-trafficking Grey
Wolves and fomented conflicts in the 1970s between the Turkish right
and left.
37
The alliance between the deep state and drug traffickers has surfaced
in other countries as well, including France, Italy, Mexico, Panama,
Pakistan, Taiwan, and Japan.
Before I deal with the four American deep events, let me stress that,
at the time of the previous events, their drug connections were
vigorously denied. But they have since become clear. I will give a few
examples. The Warren Report argued that Jack Ruby “was not involved
with Chicago’s criminal element.”
38 But in 1979 the House Assassinations
Committee assembled a report of over 1000 pages on his organized crime
connections. It heard from a close Ruby associate, Lewis McWillie, that
in 1959 the two men had visited the Trescornia camp in Cuba, and the
“primary reason” for the visit was to meet Giuseppe deGeorge, one of
the two top heroin couriers between Europe and Cuba.
39
In
Deep Politics, and especially my recently reissued book
Deep Politics Two, I discuss the importance of the drug traffic,
as a unifying factor in the JFK case. It is a key, I have argued, to
Jack Ruby’s special status with the Dallas Police Department.
40 When we look at
those who in Mexico manipulated false Oswald story -- to suggest that
Oswald had been talking about assassination there -- we again run into
people with drug backgrounds.
41 A key example is Gilberto Alvarado,
a Nicaraguan, whose story about Oswald and assassination was so serious
that we know FBI Director Hoover discussed it on November 29 with
Lyndon Johnson.
42 We now know that Alvarado, the
source," reported "directly to General Gustavo Montiel, Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the Nicaraguan Army."
43 Montiel was later denounced as a
principal in a "massive car theft ring" run by Norwin Meneses,
described in other CIA cables as "the kingpin of narcotics traffickers
in Nicaragua."
44
I have just finished a draft essay on Watergate, in which I argue that
the Watergate burglars assembled by Howard Hunt, all but one Cubans,
included at least two men with drug connections, and that they were
being used under White House direction to restructure the drug traffic
by eliminating, possibly even assassinating, old-time drug-traffickers
who formed part of the so-called “French connection.” According to
Edward J. Epstein, Hunt contacted a number of Cuban exiles and
explained “that he had been authorized by the White House to recruit
Cuban exiles into `hit teams’ which would be used ostensibly to
assassinate narcotics dealers.”
45 Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis,
after his arrest, said that in 1971 he too had joined Hunt in
investigating the drug traffic that was entering the U.S. from Mexico,
Paraguay, and Panama.
46 Sturgis claimed “that he undertook
several missions for Hunt involving tracking narcotics, and he assumed
that this was the nucleus of a new supranational police force that
would be expanded after Nixon’s reelection.”
47
Then in the 1980s we encounter the involvement in drug-trafficking of
some of the Nicaraguan Contra rebels, and more importantly of those who
were supplying them with arms. This was emphatically denied at the
time, and the two AP reporters who first broke the story both lost
their jobs. But after two full-length books on the topic (
Cocaine
Politics, by myself and Jonathan Marshall, and
Dark
Alliance, by Gary Webb, the CIA Inspector-General was commissioned
to investigate the matter. As the House Intelligence Committee later
reported, “Volume II of the CIA IG report explains in detail the
knowledge the CIA had that some contras had been, were alleged to be or
were in fact involved or somehow associated with drug trafficking or
drug traffickers.”
48
We need to stand back and consider the implications of this recurring
phenomenon. In deep events the drug connection is at first vociferously
denied; then it is belatedly admitted, but only after reporting
journalists like Gary Webb have been driven from the journalistic
profession. As a result, the role of drug-trafficking in deep events is
like the elephant in the American political living room, rarely
captured on film, and even more rarely discussed in polite
discourse.
If 9/11 is similar to these preceding events, and I believe it is, we
have to face the possibility that forces within the American deep state
were again allied with drug traffickers. In this case the traffickers
would be al Qaeda. And as the
Toronto Star speculated in 2001,
the alliance was not restricted to the deep state and al Qaeda, but
also included elements from the financial overworld:
Earlier this month, the Guardian, a U.K. newspaper, reported that FBI
agents had been told by the Bush administration to back off
investigating members of the bin Laden clan living in the U.S. In
September, the Wall Street Journal documented the lucrative business
connections between the bin Laden family and senior U.S. Republicans,
including the president’s father, George Bush Sr.
What are we to make of all this? One possible conclusion is that the
bin Laden terror problem was allowed to get out of hand because bin
Laden, himself, had powerful protectors in both Washington and Saudi
Arabia.
49
In The Road to 9/11 I suggest that those protectors included U.S. oil
companies eager to invest in Central Asia.
Drugs and Al Qaeda
How important were drugs in the financing al Qaeda? On this important
question the British and American government have different positions.
The 9/11 Commission Report, released in July 2004, went out of its way
to say that While the drug trade was a source of income for the
Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for al Qaeda, and there is
no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in or made his money
through drug trafficking.
50
I submit that this claim will look extraordinary in ten years time. The
British Parliament was told on October 4, 2001, that “al Qaeda’s
activity includes substantial exploitation of the drug trade from
Afghanistan.”
51 Only two weeks later, on August 2,
2004, Time magazine ran a major story about Haji Juma Khan …the kingpin
of a heroin-trafficking enterprise that is a principal source of
funding for the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists. According to a Western
antinarcotics official, since slipping out of Afghanistan after U.S.
forces released him, Khan has helped al-Qaeda establish a smuggling
network that is peddling Afghan heroin to buyers across the Middle
East, Asia and Europe, and in turn is using the drug revenues to
purchase weapons and explosives.
This was after US Central Command reported that in December 2003 a dhow
(an Arab sailing vessel) was intercepted near the Strait of Hormuz,
carrying almost two tons of hashish valued at up to $10 million. There
were "clear ties" between the shipment and al-Qaeda, the Centcom
statement said.”
52 A few days later, on New Year's Eve,
a U.S. Navy vessel in the Arabian Sea “stopped a small fishing boat
that was carrying no fish. After a search, [said] a Western
antinarcotics official, `they found several al-Qaeda guys sitting on a
bale of drugs.’"
53
The drug-trafficking Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, like al Qaeda a
by-product of CIA-ISI plotting in the 1980s,
54 is said to have come “under the
influence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda” after 1998.
55 And Ralf
Mutschke, Assistant Director of Interpol, told the US Congress that
“according to some estimations IMU may be responsible for 70 % of the
total amount of heroin and opium transiting through the area [of
Central Asia].”
56 While such quantitative estimates
remain uncertain, it is known that the IMU set up heroin labs in
territories under its control.
57
In
The Road to 9/11 I describe how in Azerbaijan, under oil
company cover, veterans of CIA operations in Laos, like Richard Secord,
Heinie Aderholt, and Ed Dearborn, set up an airline on the model of Air
America which soon was “picking up hundreds of Mujahideen mercenaries
from Afghanistan.”
58 The Arab Afghans’Azeri operations
were financed with Afghan heroin.
Loretta Napoleoni has argued that there is an Islamist drug route of al
Qaeda allies across North Central Asia, reaching from Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan through Azerbaijan and Chechnya to Kosovo.
59 This leads us to
the paradoxical fact that in 1998 Clinton came to the support of the al
Qaeda-backed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). He did so even though “In
1998, the U.S. State Department listed the KLA … as an international
terrorist organization, saying it had bankrolled its operations with
proceeds from the international heroin trade and from loans from known
terrorists like Osama bin Laden.”
60
Soon
Mother Jones reported that in the six months since
Washington enthroned the Kosovo Liberation Army in that Yugoslav
province, KLA-associated drug traffickers have cemented their influence
and used their new status to increase heroin trafficking and forge
links with other nationalist rebel groups and drug cartels…. According
to recent DEA statistics, Afghan heroin accounted for almost 20 percent
of the smack seized in this country -- nearly double the percentage
taken four years earlier. Much of it is distributed by Kosovar
Albanians.
61
It is now clear that the U.S. interventions in both Azerbaijan and
Kosovo have beneficial for U.S. oil pipeline projects. BBC News
announced in December 2004 that the $1.2 billion pipeline, south of a
huge new US army base in Kosovo, has been given a go-ahead by the
governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia.
62
This leads in turn to the allegations of Sibel Edmonds, the
Turkish-American former FBI translator, who has been prevented from
speaking directly by an extraordinary court order,
63 but whose
allegations have been summarized by Daniel Ellsberg:
Al Qaeda, she's been saying to congress, according to
these interviews, is financed 95% by drug money - drug traffic to which
the US government shows a blind eye, has been ignoring, because it very
heavily involves allies and assets of ours - such as Turkey,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan - all the 'Stans - in a
drug traffic where the opium originates in Afghanistan, is processed in
Turkey, and delivered to Europe where it furnishes 96% of Europe's
heroin, by Albanians, either in Albania or Kosovo - Albanian Muslims in
Kosovo - basically the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army which we backed
heavily in that episode at the end of the century.
In other words, the US is in effect, …permitting, or 'not acting
against,' a heroin trade - which not only corrupts our cities and our
city politics, AND our congress, as Sibel makes very specific - but is
financing the terrorist organization that constitutes a genuine threat
to us. And this seems to be a fact that is accepted by our top leaders,
according to Sibel, for various geopolitical reasons, and for corrupt
reasons as well. Sometimes things are simpler than they might appear -
and they involve envelopes of cash. Sibel says that suitcases of cash
have been delivered to the Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, at his
home, near Chicago, from Turkish sources, knowing that a lot of that is
drug money.
64
In 2005 Sibel Edmonds’ charges were partly aired in
Vanity Fair.
There it was revealed that Edmonds had had access to FBI wiretaps of
conversations among members of the American-Turkish Council (ATC),
about bribing elected US officials, and about “what sounded like
references to large-scale drug shipments and other crimes.”
65
Once again, as in past deep events, Sibel Edmonds’ charges have been
predictably ignored by the traditional media.
66 When I drew attention to her claims
last November, I added that “I consider a top priority of the new
Democratic Congress should be to give her charges a proper
investigation for the first time. These charges are not just pertinent
to 9/11 alone, but to the whole fabric of how this country is run.” A
massive campaign to have Congressman Henry Waxman hold Hearings on them
has however proven totally unproductive. His office has not even
answered any of the deluge of emails he has received.
Edmonds has been corroborated by Huseyin Baybasin, another Turkish
heroin kingpin now in jail in Holland, who after Susurluk went public
with revelations about state corruption, later explained his role in
his book Trial by Fire: “I handled the drugs which came through the
channel of the Turkish Consulate in England.” But as he adds: “I was
with the Mafia but I was carrying this out with the same Mafia group in
which the rulers of Turkey were part.” Baybasin claimed he was assisted
by Turkish officers working for NATO in Belgium.
67
Sibel Edmonds is not alone in alleging a 9/11-drugs connection.
68 There was also another
witness, Indira Singh, who said publicly when speaking about 9/11: “I
was told that if I mentioned the money to the drugs around 9/11 that
would be the end of me.”
69
One thing we can say with confidence: the flow of Afghan heroin west
through Turkey is a problem that can be traced back to the CIA’s
complex involvement with a) Pakistan’s ISI intelligence service, b)
with the drug-linked Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI),
and c) with Islamist Afghan mujahedeen like the drug-trafficker
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in the 1980s.
70
In fact the web of influence in America Edmonds describes corresponds
closely to BCCI’s influence in the 1980s, when the head of BCCI used to
boast to the leader of Pakistan about BCCI’s role in getting aid for
Pakistan approved by the US Congress.
71
The ISI and its assets continued to be implicated in drug trafficking
after the shutdown of BCCI in July 1991.
In an unusually frank interview in September 1994 – which he later
denied – the former Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, disclosed
that General Aslam Beg, the army chief of staff, and the ISI boss [from
1990 to 1992], Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani, had [in early 1991]
proposed raising money for covert foreign operations through
large-scale drug deals….The ISI’s involvement in the Sikh separatist
movement was recognized in a 1993 CIA report on Pakistan’s drug trade,
which stated the heroin was being used to fund its purchases of arms.”
72
Prominent in ISI’s covert foreign operations at this time were the Arab
Afghan terrorists supporting the drug trafficker Hekmatyar in
Afghanistan, of whom I am about to say much more.
If the parallels with previous deep events hold true, then 9/11 will
prove to be a collaboration between elements in the deep state and
outside drug traffickers – in this case elements of al Qaeda. Such a
thought is unthinkable if we know only what is in the mainstream media.
It looks less unlikely when we look at past U.S. alliances with
al-Qaeda-trained Islamists in Azerbaijan and Kosovo. And it seems even
less unlikely when we examine the extraordinary case of Ali Mohamed, a
top-level CIA asset who became the chief al Qaeda adviser on how to
hijack airplanes.
73
8) Double Agents: Oswald and Ali Mohamed
As I have argued elsewhere, Ali Mohamed was a double agent, just as, I
suggested 15 years ago, Lee Harvey Oswald was a double agent. (In my
Watergate article I argue that Howard Hunt also was a double agent,
working both for Nixon and somebody else. But I don’t have time to go
into that here.)
In
Deep Politics I explored at some length the possibility that
Lee Harvey Oswald was a possible “double agent…trying to infiltrate the
Dallas Cuban refugee group.”
74 I went on in
Deep Politics
(written in 1992) to make observations about Oswald as a double agent,
observations that I now consider applicable to 9/11:
The preceding chapter considered the possibility that
Oswald was associated with anti-Kennedy Cubans in order to investigate
them on behalf of a federal agency. But we saw it alleged that Oswald
was a double agent collaborating with some of these groups, either (as
I suspect) because he or his handlers shared their goals [that is,
anti-Kennedy goals], or possibly because he or his handlers had been
“turned” by those they were supposed to investigate. Such a possibility
was particularly likely with targets, like Alpha 66, about which the
government itself was conflicted, of two minds. 75
It is necessary to recall that Alpha 66 in early 1963 conducted a
series of raids, not just against Cuba, but against Soviet ships in
Cuba. It was obviously trying to shipwreck the US-Soviet understanding
on Cuba, thus to torpedo the whole Kennedy policy of détente with the
Soviet Union. Unambiguously the raids met with the total disapproval of
Robert Kennedy’s Justice Department (which cracked down on them and
made a public announcement that they had to cease). At the same time
there continued to be support for Alpha 66 from the CIA.
76
Double agents frequently become the stars both of the groups they
penetrate and the government agencies to whom they report. Recently I
have written about an analogous figure in al Qaeda: Ali Mohamed, who
was Washington’s double agent inside al-Qaeda, and also a chief 9/11
plotter.
77
Triple Cross, a new book by Peter Lance, confirms that Ali
Mohamed, one of al-Qaeda’s top trainers in terrorism and how to hijack
airplanes, was an informant for the FBI, an asset of the CIA, and for
four years a member of the US Army.
78 This special status explains why one
of his protégés, El Sayyid Nosair, was able to commit the first al
Qaeda crime in America, back in 1990, be caught along with his
co-conspirators, and yet be dismissed by the police and FBI as (and
these are actual quotes) a “lone deranged gunman” who “acted
alone.”
79
In fact, the FBI was aware back in 1990 that Mohamed had engaged in
terrorist training on Long Island; yet it acted to protect Mohamed from
arrest, even after one of his trainees had moved beyond training to an
actual assassination.
80 Three years later, in 1993, Mohamed
was actually detained in Canada by the RCMP. But he gave the RCMP the
telephone number of his FBI handler in San Francisco, and after a brief
call the RCMP released him.
81 This enabled Mohamed to fly later in
the year to Nairobi, and begin to organize the eventual al Qaeda
attacks on the US embassies in Africa.
Mohamed’s trainees were all members of the Al-Kifah Center in Brooklyn,
which served as the main American recruiting center for the
Makhtab-al-Khidimat, the “Services Center” network that after the
Afghan war became known as al Qaeda.
82 The Al-Kifah Center was headed in
1990 by the blind Egyptian Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who like Ali
Mohamed had been admitted to the United States, despite being on a
State Department Watch List.
83 As he had done earlier in Egypt, the
sheikh “issued a fatwa in America that permitted his followers to rob
banks and kill Jews.”
84
Ali Mohamed was training these Islamists to fight in Afghanistan.
However the Soviets had totally withdrawn from Afghanistan by February
1989, and all of this training was going on in late 1989, at a time
when the U.S. government, to paraphrase what was just said about 1963,
was of two minds about what to do in Afghanistan.
The CIA were backing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a major heroin trafficker
with his own heroin labs, to get rid of the secular, anti-Islamist
government in Kabul, which the Russians left behind.
85
Meanwhile a State Department official, Edmund McWilliams, objected that
“Pakistani intelligence and Hekmatyar were dangerous allies,” and that
the United States was making an important mistake by endorsing ISI’s
puppet Afghan interim government.
86 But Ali Mohamed’s training, both in
Afghanistan and later around New York, was precisely designed to
strengthen the Arab Afghans in Brooklyn who were allied with Hekmatyar.
87
Mohamed Ali’s trainees became involved in terrorist activities in other
parts of the world. One of them, Anas al-Liby, became a leader in a
plot against Libyan president Mu’ammar Qadaffi. Anas al-Liby was later
given political asylum in Great Britain, despite suspicions that he was
a high-level al Qaeda operative.
88 As the French authors Brisard and
Dasquié point out, Qadaffii’s Libya in 1998 was the first government to
ask Interpol to issue an arrest warrant for Osama bin Laden. They argue
that Osama and al Qaeda elements were collaborating with the British
MI-5 in an anti-Gaddafi assassination plot.
89
Another of Ali Mohamed’s trainees, Clement Rodney Hampton-El, accepted
money from the Saudi Embassy in Washington to recruit Muslim warriors
for Bosnia.
90 He was also allowed to go to Fort
Belvoir, where an Army major gave him a list of Muslims in the US Army
whom he could recruit.
91 Fort Belvoir was the site of the
Army’s Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), whose Information
Dominance Center was “full of army intelligence `geeks’” targeting
Islamic jihadists.
92
Hampton-El’s recruiting for Bosnia was part of a larger operation.
Numbers of Arab Afghans were trained for Bosnia, and later for the
Kosovo Liberation Army, by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the top associate of
Osama bin Laden in al Qaeda, and also a close ally of his fellow
Egyptian, Ali Mohamed.
93 (Ali Mohamed had sworn allegiance to
al-Zawahiri in 1984 while still in Egypt, and he twice arranged for
al-Zawahiri to come to stay with him in California for fund-raising
purposes.)
94
Meanwhile US intelligence veterans like Richard Secord helped bring
Arab Afghans recruited by Hekmatyar to Azerbaijan, in order to
consolidate a pro-western government there.
95 And in 1998 the US began bombing
Kosovo in support of the Kosovo Liberation Army, some of whose cadres
were both trained and supported in the field by al Qaeda’s “Arab
Afghans.”
96
So Ali Mohammad’s activities intersected with US covert operations, and
this fact appears to have earned him protection.
97 Jack Blum,
former special investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
commented that one of the big problems here is that many suspects in
the [1993] World Trade Center bombing were associated with the
Mujahedeen. And there are components of our government that are
absolutely disinterested in following that path because it leads back
to people we supported in the Afghan war.
98
What agency would have been interested in protecting Mohamed? The CIA
claimed to have ceased using him as an operative back in 1984.
99 Yet in 1988 Ali
Mohamed flew from Fort Bragg to Afghanistan and fought there, while he
was on the US Army payroll. His commanding officer didn’t like it, but
Mohammad was apparently being directed by another agency.
100 Ten years
later, in 1998, a confidential CIA internal survey concluded that it
was “partly culpable” for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, carried
out by some of Ali Mohamed’s trainees.
101
After a plea bargain, Ali Mohamed eventually pleaded guilty in 2000 to
having organized the bombings of US embassies in Africa, but as of 2006
he had still not yet been sentenced.
102
The Cover-Up Modus Operandi: He “Acted Alone”
Unambiguously Mohamed’s trainees became involved, almost immediately,
in terrorism on US soil. In November 1990, three of Mohamed’s trainees
conspired together to kill Meir Kahane, the racist founder of the
Jewish Defense League. The actual killer, El Sayyid Nosair, was caught
by accident almost immediately; and by luck the police soon found his
two co-conspirators, Mahmoud Abouhalima and Mohammed Salameh, waiting
at Nosair’s apartment. They found much more:
There were formulas for bomb making, 1,440 rounds of
ammunition, and manuals [supplied by Ali Mohamed] from the John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg marked “Top Secret for
Training,” along with classified documents belonging to the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The police found maps and drawings of New York City
landmarks like the Statue of Liberty, Times Square – and the World
Trade Center. The forty-seven boxes of evidence they collected also
included the collected sermons of blind Sheikh Omar, in which he
exhorted his followers to “destroy the edifices of capitalism.” 103
All three had been trained by Ali Mohamed back in the late 1980s at a rifle
range, where the FBI had photographed them, before terminating this surveillance
in the fall of 1989. 104 The U.S. Government was thus in an excellent
position to arrest, indict, and convict all of the terrorists involved, including
Mohamed.
Yet only hours after the killing, Joseph Borelli, Chief of NYPD detectives,
struck a familiar American note and pronounced Nosair a “lone deranged gunman.”
105 Some time later, he actually told the pressthat
“There was nothing [at Nosair’s house] that would stir your imagination…..Nothing
has transpired that changes our opinion that he acted alone.” 106
Borelli was not acting alone in this matter. His position was also that of the
FBI, who said they too believed “that Mr. Nosair had acted alone in shooting
Rabbi Kahane.” “The bottom line is that we can't connect anyone else to the
Kahane shooting," an F.B.I. agent said.” 107
The initial reaction of the NYPD had been that Nosair was part of a conspiracy.
108 This impression was strengthened when a detective
discovered that Borelli’s car had been moved after Nosair was arrested. As a
result, according to the District Attorney prosecutor on the case, William Greenbaum,
“We sensed a much bigger conspiracy, and we were sure that more than one person
was involved.” 109
How then to explain the ultimate assurances that Nosair was a lone assassin?
John Miller, who went on to be the assistant director of public affairs for
the FBI, 110 blamed the culture of the NYPD: “The prevailing
theory in the NYPD was, `Don’t make waves.’…So in the Nosair case, when Chief
Borelli turned a blind eye to the obvious, he was merely remaining true to the
culture of the NYPD.” 111 Miller’s unlikely explanation
suppressed the relevant fact that the FBI, and eventually the District Attorney’s
office which prosecuted the case, turned a blind eye to the obvious as well.
In the light of those 47 boxes of incriminating evidence, it is more likely
that the US law enforcement system has a cover-up modus operandi or MO for dealing
with a suspect who is marginally attached to intelligence operations, covert
operations, even controversial operations which are opposed by other elements
of the US government. 112
It is to tell the public (as they did earlier in the case of Oswald) that the
suspect “acted alone.”
In thus limiting the case, the police and FBI were in effect protecting Nosair’s
two Arab co-conspirators in the murder of a U.S. citizen. Both of them were
ultimately convicted in connection with the first WTC bombing, along with another
Mohamed trainee, Nidal Ayyad. The 9/11 Report, summarizing the convictions of
Salameh, Ayyad, Abouhalima, and the blind Sheikh for the WTC bombing and New
York landmarks plots, called it “this superb investigative and prosecutorial
effort.” 113 It said nothing about
the suppressed evidence found in Nosair’s house, including “maps and drawings
of New York City landmarks,” which if pursued should have prevented both plots
from developing.
And proper surveillance of this circle might have led investigators to the developing
9/11 plot as well. “Lance pinpoints how, in 1991, the FBI, knowing of a New
Jersey mail box store with direct links to al-Qaida, failed to keep it under
watch. Just six years later, two of the 9/11 hijackers got their fake IDs at
the same location.” 114
The Repeated Modus Operandi for Cover-up
There is a repeated cover-up MO here which is observed in both the JFK assassination
and the two WTC attacks. These deep events were not properly solved, because
the designated principals in them could not be properly investigated. The pre-selected
candidates were ones about whom the truth did not emerge, because of the
candidates’ controversial involvement in previous covered-up operations.
This ensured that an institutional cover-up, already in place, was extended
to cover the new crime, even though it was a major one.
Oswald was one such pre-selected candidate. Those conspiratorially involved
with Ali Mohamed and with 9/11 would also seem to fit the same description.
That is what struck me most when I went back to compare the two meta-events:
the killings of Kennedy and of Meir Kahane. Both Oswald and Nosair were quickly
declared “lone” assassins, to protect someone or something else.
(Another man about whom the whole truth never emerged was Howard Hunt in Watergate,
of whom President said to his aide Haldeman, “Hunt…will uncover a lot of things.
You open that scab there’s a hell of a lot of things.” 115
This became the key to the cover-up that eventually cost Nixon his presidency.
Fear of the Hunt “scab” apparently induced both Nixon and Helms to collude in
ordering the FBI to suspend its interviews.) 116
I should make clear that with respect to 9/11, I have certain knowledge of only
one fact: that there has been and continues to be a massive cover-up. I have
not yet properly integrated the earlier cover-up in 1990 of Nosair’s associates,
including Ali Mohamed, into my theory of what happened in 2001. I do however
believe that the earlier cover-up is relevant to the later one, as exemplified
by the strange treatment of the first WTC attack in the 9/11 Commission Report.
The similarity between the cover-up of Oswald in 1963 and Nosair in 1990 is
striking. In both cases the truth about the predesignated culprit was unpursuable,
because he was part of an operation too embarrassing to disclose. In the case
of the Ali Mohamed trainees, this is a major scandal. These people could have
been stopped back in 1990, before they attacked the World Trade Center. And
they weren’t.
I conclude from this that it is a matter of paramount importance to learn more
about these meta-events and their cover-ups. Because when we can understand
what has happened before, we will be more able to deal with such a meta-event
when it happens again. As I have said so many times, to understand any of these
events in real depth, you have to look at what is on-going in all of them.
The traditional media seem determined, predictably, not to help in this matter.
In November 2006, six weeks after Lance’s Triple Cross was released,
Lexis Nexis recorded only one post-publication reference to it or to Ali Mohamed
-- the Toronto Sun of 11/19/06. 117 But there is no lack
of interest on the Internet, where at the same time there were 43,600 hits on
Triple Cross.) 118
The gravity of the Ali Mohamed matter is compounded by the context of the drug
traffic. To get to the level where we can cope and deal with these recurring
problems in our country, we will have to understand the continuity, and deal
with it every time it surfaces.
Conclusions
Some of the similarities noted here are probably extrinsic to the events described.
But others point to a strong common denominator between JFK and 9/11. We can
mention in particular the following features of a common modus operandi:
1) The prior designation of a suspect or suspects. These had a past intelligence
involvement, which obstructed proper investigation of them, and of the deep
events attributed to them. In both cases the suspects either were or involved
double agents, with life stories or legends on two different levels.
2) The laying of a paper trail. This was strong enough to ensure that
investigation would lead promptly to the designated suspects.
3) The immediate attribution of the deep event to the designated suspects.
4) The announcement that the suspect or suspects acted alone, even when
there was clear evidence to show this was not true. 119
5) Both deep events involved experienced criminals, drawn from the world of
organized drug trafficking.
JFK and 9/11 as Gateways to Already-Intended Wars
As I prepared this list of similarities for a June 2007 lecture in Vancouver,
I had to recognize in myself a profound resistance to acknowledging this pattern.
I didn’t want to accept this indication that there might be a hidden force intervening
to affect our history at least twice over a forty-year period.
So after the lecture I laid this paper to one side. I shared it only with a
few intimate correspondents for their opinions, hoping that they would persuade
me to discount the pattern.
And then, six weeks later, it struck me that I had suppressed, even to myself,
what should have been for me the most obvious and relevant similarities of all
between JFK and 9/11:
6) Both events opened the path to major wars (Vietnam in 1964-65, Afghanistan
followed by Iraq in 2001), upon which a small but powerful group were already
intent. In the case of Vietnam, so-called OPLAN 34A plans for escalating
the war against North Vietnam were already approved at a DOD/CIA Conference
in Honolulu on November 20, 1963, even though Kennedy had never seen these plans
and would in all probability (I believe) not have approved them.120 (The 34A Operations led
in August 1964 to the first bombing of North Vietnam with U.S. planes, something
which “President Kennedy for two and one-half years had resisted.”121 In October 1963 Kennedy
had set in motion plans to withdraw the bulk of U.S troops from Vietnam by late
1965.)122 Right after 9/11, a former
Pakistani diplomat, Niaz Naik, told the BBC that senior American officials had
told him in mid-July 2001 that military action against Afghanistan was likely
to go ahead “before the snows started falling in Afghanistan, by the middle
of October at the latest.”123
If this founding similarity is recognized, two more follow quickly:
7) Both wars were followed by explosive increases in opium and heroin production.
Thanks to the Vietnam War, opium production in the Golden Triangle expanded
from about 80 tons in the early 1950s, to 300-400 tons in 1963, to a peak of
1,200 tons a year. 124 The U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan, accomplished with the aid of professional drug traffickers, has
seen an increase in Afghan opium production from 3,276 metric tonnes of opium
in 2000, and 185 tonnes in 2001 (the year of the Taliban prohibition) to a new
record high of 6,610 metric tonnes in 2006, a 43 percent increase over 2005.
125 As a result Afghanistan’s share of global
opium production increased from 70 percent in 2000 to 82 percent in 2006. 126
U.N. figures to be released in September 2007 are expected to show that Afghanistan
now accounts for 95 percent of the world's crop. 127
8) Both wars served the interests of international oil companies, and prior
to the relevant deep events had been actively lobbied for by them. Before
1963 one of the most active lobbyists for U.S. military engagement in Southeast
Asia had been William Henderson, adviser on International Affairs to Socony
Mobil and an officer of American Friends of Vietnam. 128 The threats delivered to the Taliban before
9/11 were in support of Unocal’s desire to build oil and gas pipelines through
the country from Turkmenistan to Pakistan. 129
Elsewhere I have looked at these recurring overlapping patterns of drugs, oil,
and war, in a book of the same name. It is a tribute to force of psychological
denial that, even having written about them previously, I so long repressed
their relevance to the subject now being discussed: why certain events in the
assassination of John F. Kennedy replicated themselves in the events of 9/11.
Thinking in this way about the Vietnam War made me realize that the pattern
of recurrence outlined in this chapter was not (as I first thought) a total
novelty for me. It was similar to examples of unexplained recurrences that I
had written about in The War Conspiracy, and that had contributed to the initiation
and escalation of the Vietnam War. For example the falsified accounts of the
spurious second Tonkin Gulf incident of 1964 shared many features with the falsified
accounts about North Korea’s seizure in 1968 of spy ship Pueblo. (Both
incidents involved vessels on electronic intelligence or ELINT missions; both
incidents involved manipulation of evidence from alleged intercepts of enemy
cable traffic, etc., etc.)130
And then I realized that I had looked at a similar pattern of recurrence in
my book Drugs, Oil, and War, when I asked the uncomfortable question
(which I did not pursue): “Did successive crises in the illicit drug traffic
induce some drug-trafficking U.S. interest groups and allies to press successfully
for U.S. involvement in an Asian war?”131
I invite readers to consider and investigate all these patterns, whose import
I do not claim to fully understand. However, as I also said in Vancouver in
June 2007, our country faces the risk of another 9/11 incident, followed by
another military engagement that Cheney has lobbied for: in Iran.
Footnotes:
1 In this paper the term “Watergate” will refer to the
initial Watergate break-ins only, to the exclusion of all the other dirty tricks
that were ultimately traced to the Nixon House.
2 Adrian Gatton, “The Susurluk Legacy,” http:// adriangatton.com/archive/1990_01_01_archive.html.
Both Catli and the terrorist Grey Wolves network from which he emerged had global
intelligence connections. In 1978 “Catli linked up with notorious Italian right-wing
terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie and together they traveled to Latin America and
the United States” (Daniele Ganser, NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio
and Terrorism in Western Europe [London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005], 237-38.
3 Martin A. Lee, “On the Trail of Turkey's Terrorist
Grey Wolves,” ConsortiumNews, 1997, http:// www.consortiumnews.com/archive/story33.html.
4 Even the vocabularies of the old and new media diverge.
A Lexis Nexis search in December 2006 for the word “parapolitics” in major newspapers
yielded five entries, only two of them from the United States. The same search
on Google yielded 86,100 hits. Meanings of “parapolitics”: 1) “A system or practice
of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished” (Peter Dale Scott,
The War Conspiracy [New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1972], 171). 2) The intellectual
study of parapolitical interactions between public states and other forms of
organized violence. See Robert Cribb and Peter Dale Scott, “Introduction,” in
Eric Wilson and Tim Lindsey (eds.), Government of the Shadows: Parapolitics
and Criminal Sovereignty (London: Pluto, 2007).
5 The dip and recovery of the stock market on November
22, 1963 were given prominent attention in Lincoln Lawrence, Were We Controlled.
6 Petr Dale Scott, “The Dallas Conspiracy” (unpublished
ms., 1973), Ch. III, 36. Cf. Joan Mellen, “The Kennedy Assassination and the
Current Political Moment,” http:// www.joanmellen.net/truth-2.html.
7 Paul Thompson, Terror Timeline, ; http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/ timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&before_9/
11=insiderTrading.
8 "We believe it was by design," J. Gary Shaw writes
in his book Cover-Up, "that Secretary of State (Dean) Rusk, Treasury
Secretary Douglas Dillon, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall and Labor Secretary
W.W. Wirtz, as well as other administration officials like White House Press
Secretary (Pierre) Salinger, were trapped in an airplane over the Pacific Ocean
at such a critical time." 1 (The other two Cabinet members aboard were Secretary
of Commerce Luther Hodges and Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman. (http:// four.fsphost.com/crevmore/acretoky.htm)
9 Thompson, Terror Timeline, 400.
10 FBI HQ Supervisor W. Marvin Gheesling was censured
and transferred to Detroit “for removing stop on Oswald in Ident on 10/9/63”
(NARA RIF #124-10371-10033; FBI file 62-117290-Admin Folder-V3, Response to
SSC re Gayle Memo 9/30/64, 21, http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/ viewer/showDoc.do?absPageId=300123).
Cf. John Newman, “Oswald and the Mexico City Tapes,” JFK Lancer Conference,
Dallas, November 19, 1999, 3, http:// www.jfklancer.com/backes/newman/newman_3.html:
“Now, the day before the Mexico City story hits the FBI they cancel the flash
on Oswald. This is an example of what I'm talking about, dimming the switches.”
11 For details see Terrorist Timeline under “Maltbie,”
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/ entity.jsp?entity=michael_maltbie:
“RFU chief Dave Frasca stops the Minneapolis office from pursuing a criminal
warrant (see August 21, 2001); When French authorities discover that Moussaoui
is connected to the Chechen rebels, RFU agent Mike Maltbie insists that the
FBI representative in Paris go through all telephone directories in France to
see how many Zacarias Moussaouis live there (see August 22, 2001); When RFU
agent Rita Flack, who is working on the Moussaoui case, reads the Phoenix memo
suggesting that bin Laden is sending pilots to the US for training, she apparently
does not tell her colleagues about it, even though it was addressed to several
of them including Frasca (see July 10, 2001 and August 22, 2001); The RFU does
not provide the relevant documentation to attorneys consulted about the request.
In particular, Flack does not tell them about the Phoenix memo, even though
one of the attorneys will later say she asked Flack if anyone is sending radical
Islamists to the US to learn to fly (see August 22-28, 2001).”
12 Newsday, March 21, 2006, http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-
mous214670355mar21,0,2844591.story.
13 9/11 Commission Report, 269-72; Lawrence
Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf,
2006), 339-44.
14 Thompson, Terror Timeline, 101.
15 http:// www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a1299surprisingpresence;
citing Shaffer testimoiny to US Congress, 2/15/2006. Government Security
News, August 2005.
16 E.g., Gaeton Fonzi,
The Last Investigation
(New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1993), esp. 141-42; John Newman,
Oswald and
the CIA (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1995), 318-419; Lamar Waldron with Thom
Hartmann,
Ultimate Sacrifice: John and Robert Kennedy, the Plan for a Coup
in Cuba, and the Murder of JFK (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006), 531-46.
17 Particularly suggestive in this respect is RFU Agent
Michael Maltbie’s weakening of a proposed FISA application by editing it and removing
a statement by a CIA officer that Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab was closely
connected to Osama bin Laden (“Michael Maltbie,” Terror Timeline, August 28, 2001,
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/ entity.jsp?entity=michael_maltbie.
18 Coleen Rowley Report, 5; quoted in Steve Moore,
“The FBI's Radical Fundamentalist Unit in Washington D.C.,” Global Research,
August 18, 2002, http:// www.globalresearch.ca/articles/MOO208B.html.
19 Ahmed Rashid, “America's Bad Deal With Musharraf,
Going Down in Flames,” Washington Post, June 17, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2007/06/15/AR2007061502073.html:
“The roots of the crisis go back to the blind bargain Washington made after
9/11 with the regime that had heretofore been the Taliban's main patron: ignoring
Musharraf's despotism in return for his promises to crack down on al-Qaeda and
cut the Taliban loose. Today, despite $10 billion in U.S. aid to Pakistan since
2001, that bargain is in tatters; the Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and
al-Qaeda's senior leadership has set up another haven inside Pakistan's chaotic
border regions.”
20 Mark H. Gaffney, “The 911 Mystery Plane,” http://www.rense.com/ general76/missing.htm;
citing U.S. Department of Defense, News Transcript, "Secretary Rumsfeld Interview
with the Washington Post," January 9, 2002, posted at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/ t02052002_t0109wp.html;
Joe Dejka, "Inside STRATCOM on September 11: Offutt exercise took real-life
twist," Omaha World-Herald, February 27, 2002.
21 Assistant Attorney-General Nicholas Katzenbach later
testified that he was “astounded” that Dulles did not at least share with the
other commissioners what he knew about the CIA’s involvement in relevant assassination
plots at the time (Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles
(Boston: Richard Todd/Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 552; citing House Select Committee
on Assassinations, Investigation of the Assassination of President John F.
Kennedy, Vol. 3, 699-71.
22 Scott, Deep Politics, 249.
23 Scott, Deep Politics, 258.
24 Emery, Watergate, 111-12. In addition Hunt
deposited photographic evidence of the Fielding break-in at CIA headquarters,
which surely can have served no other purpose than to leave an incriminating
trail.
25 Haldeman, The Ends of Power, 30.
26 Newsday, April 17, 2006, http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-
uslugg0417,0,3743892.story?coll=ny-homepage-bigpix2005.
27 Newsday, April 17, 2006. The belated airing
of the Flagg story in 2006 has aroused suspicions that it was invented to allay
the many earlier questions raised about how the FBI learned the names of the
alleged hijackers so quickly (see next section). FBI Director Robert Mueller
told the Commonwealth Club of California on April 19, 2002 that "The hijackers
also left no paper trail. In our investigation, we have not uncovered a single
piece of paper – either here in the U.S. or in the treasure trove of information
that has turned up in Afghanistan and elsewhere – that mentioned any aspect
of the September 11th plot” (http:// www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech041902.htm).
But CNN had reported on September 28, 2001, that “among [Atta’s] belongings
they also found the names and phone numbers of possible associates;” (http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/28/ ltm.01.html);
and that this “information compliments the release of photos of the suspected
hijackers” (http:// edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/28/ltm.15.html).
I am grateful to Jon Gold for bringing these matters to my attention.
28 United States of America vs. Zacarias Moussaoui,
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division,
www.usdoj.gov/ ag/moussaouiindictment.htm,
items 88, 92.
29 WR 5, 17 WH 397 (Transcript of Dallas Police Channel
One, before 12:45 PM, 11/22/63).
30 E.g. CIA Cable 74830 of 10 Oct 63 to Mexico City,
http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/ archive/viewer/showDoc.do?docId=30335&relPageId=2;
reproduced in John Newman, Oswald and the CIA (New York: Carroll & Graf,
1995), 512.
31 Manning Clements FBI FD-302 of 11/23/63; in Warren
Report, 614.
32 WR 5. Brennan subsequently failed to pick out Oswald
in a police line-up (Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact [Mary
Ferrell Foundation Press, 2006], 10-13, 78n).
33 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside
America’s War on Terrorism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 13-14.
34 William Norman Grigg, “Did We Know What Was Coming?”
New American, 3/11/02, http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/2002/03-11- 2002/vo18no05_didweknow.htm.
35 Peter Lance, Triple Cross (New York: Regan/HarperCollins,
2006), 383.
36 Newsday, April 17, 2006.
37 Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT): Annual
Report 1997; Martin A. Lee, “On the Trail of Turkey's Terrorist Grey Wolves,”
ConsortiumNews, 1997, http:// www.consortiumnews.com/archive/story33.html.
38 Warren Report, 785.
39 Scott, Deep Politics, 180-81
40 Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death
of JFK (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 70-71, 132, 136-38.
41 Scott, Deep Politics Two, 130-36.
42 Michael Beschloss, ed., Taking Charge: The Johnson
White House Tapes, 1963-1964 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 53. In
a memorandum of the same day Hoover noted that it was Johnson, not Hoover, who
initiated the call (3 AH 476). The call logs of the LBJ Library (available
on its website) indicate that the call was from Hoover to Johnson.
43 Attachment to CIA Memo of 12 December 1963 from
DDP to FBI, "Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto Alvarado;" NARA #104-10018-10043.
44 Webb, Dark Alliance, 55-56 (Montiel); Scott,
Drugs, Contras, and the CIA, 15 ("kingpin”).
45 Epstein, Agency of Fear, 205.
46 Scott, Hoch, Stetler, The Assassinations,
402.
47 Epstein, Agency of Fear, 205n
48 House Select Committee on Intelligence on Report
of CIA Inspector-General Frederick Heitz, quoted in Robert Parry, “CIA Admits
Tolerating Contra- Cocaine Trafficking in 1980s,” ConsortiumNews.com, June 8,
2000, http:// www.consortiumnews.com/2000/060800a.html.
49 Toronto Star, November 27, 2001; quoted with discussion
in Scott, The Road to 9/11, 176.
50 9/11 Report, 171. I find this statement one-sided
and misleading, but less so than the opposite claim of Yossef Bodansky: “The
annual income of the Taliban from the drug trade is estimated at $8 billion.
Bin Laden administers and manages these funds – laundering them through the
Russian mafia… (Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America
[New York: Random House/Prima, 2001], 315).
51 "Evidence Presented to the British Parliament, 4th October 2001,"
Los Angeles Times, 10/4/01. Cf. e.g. Minneapolis Star-Tribune,
9/30/01; Asia Times, 12/8/01; New York Times, 10/4/01,
10/11/01; San Francisco Chronicle, 10/4/01. For further documentation,
see Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War: The United States in Afghanistan,
Colombia, and Indochina (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 32, 36.
52 US `seizes al-Qaeda
drugs ship'," BBC News, 12/19/03.
53 Time, August 2, 2004.
54 Robert Dreyfuss, Devil's Game: How the United
States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry
Holt, 2005), 287: “There is no question that the Casey-ISI actions aided the
growth of a significant network of right-wing Islamist extremists [including]
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.”
55 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network
of Terror (New York: Columbia UP, 2002), 170. Cf. New York Times,
5/3/01: “There are sketchy but widely circulated stories that the [IMU] militants
are trained by the Taliban and receive money from drug traffickers and from
Osama bin Laden, the exiled Saudi accused of leading an international terrorist
group.” Cf. Guardian, 5/17/05 “Both the US and Britain link the IMU to
al-Qaida, and the Afghan heroin trade.”
56 "The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized
Crime, Drugs Trafficking and Terrorism,” Written Testimony of Ralf Mutschke,
Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, International Criminal
Police Organization – Interpol General Secretariat, before a hearing of the
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, December 13, 2000, http:// judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/muts1213.htm.
Rashid quotes from the last sentence.
57 Wall Street Journal, 5/3/01.
58 Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue
Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic (Armonk,
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 272-75. Richard Secord was allegedly attempting also
to sell Israeli arms, with the assistance of Israeli agent David Kimche, another
associate of Oliver North. The mujahedin were recruited in Afghanistan by Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, the leading recipient of CIA assistance in Afghanistan in the 1980s,
and most recently a leader of the al Qaeda-Taliban resistance to the US and
its client there, Hamid Karzai. See Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 7, 8,
20.
59 Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing
the Dollars behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Stories Press,
2005), 90-97: “[IMU leader] Namangiani’s networks in Tajikistan and in Central
Asia were used to smuggle opium from Afghanistan. It was partly thanks to Namangiani’s
contacts in Chechnya that heroin reached Europe” (91)….. “It was thanks to the
mediation of Chechen criminal groups that the KLA and the Albanian mafia managed
to gain control of the transit of heroin in the Balkans” (96). Napoleoni does
not mention Azerbaijan, which however lies between Uzbekistan and Chechnya.
60 “KLA Funding Tied To Heroin Profits,” Washington
Times, 5/3/99.
61 Peter Klebnikov, “Heroin Heroes,” Mother Jones,
Jan.-Feb. 2001. I have written elsewhere of how what I called a meta-group affiliated
with Adnan Khashoggi took advantage of the NATO bombing of Kosovo to consolidate
the Kosovar drug route via Abkhazia (and Turkey). See "The Far West
Drug Meta-Group -- Part 1." Article for Nexus: New Times Magazine,
13.3, June-July 2006, 25-31, 82, http:/ /www.nexusmagazine.com/articles/DrugMetaGroup1.html.
This version is without footnotes; go to "The Global Drug
Meta-Group: Drugs, Managed Violence, and the Russian 9/11" (Lobster, 10/29/05,
http:// lobster-magazine.co.uk/articles/global-drug.htm,
for a footnoted version. In February 2006 a member of the meta-group confirmed
part of my hypothesis: namely, that the so-called “Pristina dash” of Russian
troops to seize Kosovo’s main airport had been prepared for by his meta-group
colleague Vladimir Filin (Anton Surikov, Pravda-info, 2/8/06, http:// forum.msk.ru/material/power/7495.html;
cf. http:// www.left.ru/burtsev/ops/prishtina.phtml).
62 BBC News, 12/28/04. Those who charged that such
a pipeline was projected were initially mocked but gradually vindicated (Guardian,
1/15/01; Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 34).
63 On October 18, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft
invoked the State Secrets Privilege in order to prevent disclosure of the nature
of Edmonds' work on the grounds that it would endanger national security.
64 Daniel Ellsberg with Kris Welch, KPFA, 8/26/06,
http://wotisitgood4.blogspot.com/2006/10/ ellsberg-hastert-got-suitcases-of-al.html.
65 Vanity Fair, September 2005. According to
the ATC web site, “As one of the leading business associations in the United
States, the American-Turkish Council (ATC) is dedicated to effectively strengthening
U.S.-Turkish relations through the promotion of commercial, defense, technology,
and cultural relations. Its diverse membership includes Fortune 500,
U.S. and Turkish companies, multinationals, nonprofit organizations, and individuals
with an interest in U.S.-Turkish relations.” It is thus comparable to the American
Security Council, whose activities in 1963 are discussed in Scott, Deep Politics,
e.g. 292.
66 In December 2006 a Lexis Nexis search of major newspapers
for “Sibel Edmonds” and “drug” produced no relevant results. A similar search
on Google yielded 99,100.
67 “The Susurluk Legacy,” By Adrian Gatton, Druglink
Magazine, Nov/Dec 2006, http://adriangatton.com/archive/1990_01_01_archive.html
68 The most sensational charge of a direct 9/11-drug
connection is made by Daniel Hopsicker in his self-published book Welcome
to Terrorland. “Hopsicker is still researching the three Huffman-trained
9/11 pilots, who he says had financial, drug-trafficking and military intelligence
ties to the U.S. government. He is developing suspicions that Atta and the entire
school were involved with Osama bin Laden in heroin trafficking. Hopsicker reports
that on July 25, 2000, the DEA in Orlando discovered more than 30 pounds of
heroin inside a Learjet owned by Wally Hilliard, owner of Huffman Aviation.
Earlier that month, on July 3, Atta and Marwan Al-Shehri had started flight
lessons at Huffman. Hopsicker claims it's not a coincidence that Atta was allegedly
importing heroin with Hilliard's help, selling Afghanistan's notorious opium
and heroin to finance the Taliban. Hilliard would not be interviewed for this
story. `The apparatus that Osama bin Laden set into place along with the CIA
back in the '80s, still exists,’ Hopsicker says. `The FBI is protecting an operation
set in place back in the '80s...a money-laundering device to funnel money to
the Afghan Mujahedeen and to flood this country with heroin’” (Sander Hicks,
Long Island Press, 2/26/04, http:// www.911citizenswatch.org/
modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=82). Hopsicker’s charges
are reported, but only minimally corroborated, in Sander Hicks, The Big Wedding
(Vox Pop #2, 2005), 31-39. Most other researchers, myself included, are looking
for more independent corroboration.
69 Indira Singh testimony, 9/11 Citizen’s Commission,
128, http:// www.justicefor911.org/September-Hearings.doc.
Indira Singh was a one-time senior employee of J.P. Morgan, who was fired after
she shared her concerns about an Arab-financed contracting firm with her bank
and the FBI.
70 Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 27-58.
71 Peter Truell, and Larry Gurwin, False Profits:
The Inside Story of BCCI, the World’s Most Corrupt Financial Empire (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 132.
72 Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban
Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 149-50; Washington
Post, 9/12/94. A13.
73 Scott, The Road to 9/11, 150-58, etc.
74 Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK,
252; quoting Lucille Connell, 26 WH 738.
75 Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK,
257.
76 Hinckle and Turner, Deadly Deceits, 173-76.
Cf. Hancock, Someone Would Have Talked, 177-78.
77 Peter Dale Scott, "The Background of 9/11: Drugs,
Oil, and US Covert Operations," in David Ray Griffin and Peter Dale Scott (eds.),
9/11 & American Empire: Intellectuals Speak Out (Northampton, MA: Olive
Branch Press, 2006), 73-78. For updates, see my website at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/q.html.
78 Lance, Triple Cross, xxvii, etc.
79 Newsday, 11/8/90; quoted in Peter Lance,
1000 Years for Revenge, (New York: Regan Books/ Harper Collins, 2003),
New York Times, 12/16/90.
80 Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge, 29-37.
81 Lance, Triple Cross, 123-25.
82 Robert Dreyfuss, Devil's Game: How the United
States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry
Holt, 2005), 278; John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America, and
International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 87-88; Lance, 1000
Years for Revenge, 29-31; Independent, 11/1/98.
83 Rahman was issued two visas, one of them “by a CIA
officer working undercover in the consular section of the American embassy in
Sudan” (Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama
bin Laden [New York: Free Press, 2001], 67). FBI consultant Paul Williams
writes that Ali Mohamed “settled in America on a visa program controlled by
the CIA” (Paul L. Williams, Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror [[Upper Saddle
River, NJ]: Alpha/ Pearson Education, 2002], 117). Others allegedly admitted,
despite being on the State Department watch list, were Mohamed Atta and possibly
Ayman al-Zawahiri (Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, The War on Truth: 9/11, Disinformation,
and the Anatomy of Terrorism [Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2005],
205, 46).
84 Wright, The Looming Tower, 177.
85 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin
Press, 2004), 195. In retrospect, the decision to back Hekmatyar against Najibullah
appears to have been disastrous. As Ahmed Rashid predicted accurately in 1990,
“If Afghanistan fragments into warlordism, the West can expect a flood of cheap
heroin that will be impossible to stop …Afghanistan's President Najibullah has
skillfully played on Western fears of a drugs epidemic by repeatedly offering
co-operation with the DEA and other anti- narcotic agencies, but the West, which
still insists on his downfall, has refused. If President [George Herbert] Bush
and Margaret Thatcher continue to reject a peace process, they must prepare
for an invasion of Afghan-grown heroin in Washington and London” (Ahmed Rashid,
“Afghanistan heroin set to flood West,” Independent (London), 3/25/90:
“In early 1988 the State Department negotiators had been preparing to accept
an end to CIA assistance.” They then reversed themselves and held out for a
matching of Soviet and CIA support to the two factions. Apparently the policy
shift was motivated by an unscripted remark by Reagan to a television interviewer
(Coll, Ghost Wars, 176-77).
86 Coll, Ghost Wars, 196; cf. 197-202; Barnett
Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale UP, 2002), 251.
McWilliams’ argument found support among mid-level State Department officials
in Washington; “Still, the more State Department officials mouthed the McWilliams
line, the more Langley argued the contrary” (Coll, Ghost Wars, 197).
87 Cf. Lance, Triple Cross, 20, 66.
88 Lance, Triple Cross, 104-05. In May 2000
al-Liby’s house in Britain was raided; and the police discovered an al Qaeda
terror manual which was largely written and translated by Ali Mohamed.
89 Brisard and Dasquié, Forbidden Truth, 97-102,
155-59. A leader in the plot was Anas al-Liby, who was later given political
asylum in Great Britain, despite suspicions that he was a high-level al Qaeda
operative. He was trained in terrorism by the triple agent Ali Mohamed, while
Mohamed was still on the payroll of the U.S. Army (Peter Lance, Triple Cross:
How Bin Laden's Chief Security Adviser Penetrated the CIA, the FBI, and the
Green Berets [New York: Regan, 2006], 104; see also Chapter IX).
90 United States v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman
et al., Federal Court, SDNY, 15629-30, 15634-35, 15654, 15667-68, 15671,
15673; Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad, 72-74; J.M. Berger, “Al Qaeda Recruited
U.S. Servicemen: Testimony Links Plot To Saudi Gov't,” Intelwire.com, http:// intelwire.egoplex.com/hamptonel010604.html.
91 United States v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman
et al., Federal Court, SDNY, 15629-30, 15634-35, 15654, 15667-68, 15671,
15673; Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad, 72-74; J.M. Berger, “Al Qaeda Recruited
U.S. Servicemen: Testimony Links Plot To Saudi Gov't,” Intelwire.com, http:// intelwire.egoplex.com/hamptonel010604.html.
In my talk, I said erroneously that Hampton-El was recruiting for Afghanistan.
92 Lance, Triple Cross, 331.
93 Marcia Christoff Kurop, “Al Qaeda’s Balkan Links,”
Wall Street Journal, 11/1/01: “For the past 10 years…Ayman al-Zawahiri
has operated terrorist training camps [and] weapons of mass destruction factories
throughout Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey and Bosnia.”
94 Lance, Triple Cross, 11, 194-98.
95 Peter Dale Scott, “The Background of 9/11: Drugs,
Oil, and U.S. Covert Operations,” in David Ray Griffin and Peter Dale Scott
(eds.), 9/11 & American Empire, 75-76.
96 Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared
War on America (Roseville: Prima, 2001), 298, 397-98.
97 Cf. Robert Friedman, Village Voice, 3/30/93:
“In the aftermath of the bombing, many are wondering why there wasn't a comprehensive,
wide-ranging investigation of Meir Kahane's murder. One possible explanation
is offered by a counterterrorism expert for the FBI. At a meeting in a Denny's
coffee shop in Los Angeles a week after the Kahane assassination, the 20-year
veteran field agent met with one of his top undercover operatives, a burly 33-year-old
FBI contract employee who had been a premier bomber for a domestic terrorist
group before being `turned’ and becoming a government informant. `Why aren't
we going after the sheikh [Abdel Rahman]?’ demanded the undercover man. `It's
hands-off,’ answered the agent. `Why?’ asked the operative. `It was no accident
that the sheikh got a visa and that he's still in the country,’ replied the
agent, visibly upset. `He's here under the banner of national security, the
State Department, the NSA [National Security Agency], and the CIA.’"
98 Robert I. Friedman, Village Voice, 3/30/93.
99 Lance, Triple Cross, 16.
100 Lance, Triple Cross, 43: “Ali Mohamed defied
his commanding officer and prepared to go [to Afghanistan] anyway. At that point,
it seems clear that he was serving two sets of masters at Bragg.”
101 Andrew Marshall, Independent, 11/1/98.
102 Lance, Triple Cross, 3, 7. The CIA has
shown through the years the lengths it will go to, to prevent having its sometime
assets testify in open court. Cf. Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics,
36; Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Contras and the CIA: Government Policies
and the Cocaine Economy. An Analysis of Media and Government Response to the
Gary Webb Stories in the San Jose Mercury News (1996-2000) (Los Angeles:
From the Wilderness Publications, 2000), 39-40, etc.
103 Lance, 1000 Years, 34.
104 Lance, 1000 Years, 31; Peter Lance, Cover
Up: What the Government Is Still Hiding about the War on Terror (New York:
Regan Books/ HarperCollins, 2004), 25.
105 Newsday, 11/8/90; quoted in Lance, 1000
Years, 35.
106 New York Times, 11/8/90; Robert
I. Friedman, Village Voice, 3/30/93.
107 New York Times, 12/16/90.
108 “Nosair, the NYPD had already learned, had apparently
not acted alone…Lieutenant Eddie Norris…seemed to be looking at a conspiracy
involving three and possibly more assassins.” (John Miller and Michael Stone,
with Chris Mitchell, The Cell [New York: Hyperion, 2003), 43].
109 Lance, Triple Cross, 59.
110 Lance, Triple Cross, 115.
111 Miller et al., The Cell, 44-45.
112 John Miller, who went on to be the assistant director
of public affairs for the FBI (Lance, Triple Cross, 115), blames the
culture of the NYPD: “The prevailing theory in the NYPD was, `Don’t make waves.’…So
in the Nosair case, when Chief Borelli turned a blind eye to the obvious, he
was merely remaining true to the culture of the NYPD” (The Cell, 44-45.)
Miller’s unlikely explanation suppresses the relevant fact that the FBI turned
a blind eye to the obvious as well.
113 9/11 Report, 72.
114 Toronto Sun, 11/19/06.
115 Haldeman, The Ends of Power, 33.
116 Emery. Watergate, 193. Helms testified under oath
that he had no knowledge of any CIA exposure by Hunt’s activities. Yet unmistakably
he sent a memo to Vernon Walters, the CIA Deputy Director, repeating that the
FBI should “confine themselves to the persons already arrested or directly under
suspicion and…desist from expanding this investigation.”
117 The New York Times (8/28/06) did cover,
albeit disparagingly, an earlier National Geographic TV special in August 2006,
which drew selectively from Lance’s work.
118 The silence of the US press about Triple Cross
was broken very slightly on 12/19/06, with the following bland reference in
the New York Times in the wake of the firing by News Corp of the book’s
publisher, Judith Regan: “Peter Lance, the author of '`Triple Cross,'’ an investigative
work about the F.B.I. and the terror network of Osama Bin Laden, said Ms. Regan
abandoned his book, released in late November, when the media storm erupted
over the O. J. Simpson project, even canceling a scheduled interview with him
on her own radio program.”
119 In the case of 9/11, the restriction was not confined
to the nineteen hijackers, but to al Qaeda as an organization.
120 Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy: The
Secret Road to the Second Indochina War (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1972),
53-55, 66, 162-63.
121 Kaiser, American Tragedy,
211.
122 See Scott, Deep Politics, 24-37;
"Exit Strategy: In 1963, Kennedy ordered a Complete Withdrawal from Vietnam,"
by James K. Galbraith (Boston Review, Oct.-Nov. 2003).
123 BBC News, September 18, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1550366.stm.
Naik accurately predicted to BBC not only the timing of the October U.S. attack,
but its source in Tajikistan. Cf. Abid Ullah Jan, Afghanistan: The Genesis
of the Final Crusade (BookSurge Publishing, 2007), 27; John Pilger, The
New Rulers of the World (London: Verso, 2003), 109; Richard D. Mahoney,
Getting Away with Murder (Arcade, 2004), 176.
124 Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War,
40; citing McCoy, Politics of Heroin, 162, 286-87.
125 International Herald Tribune, July 17,
2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/18/asia/AS-GEN- Afghanistan.php.
126 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The
Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem, 2003, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/ afg_opium_economy_www.pdf;
World Drug Report, 2007, 195, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/ wdr07/WDR_2007_3.1.1_afghanistan.pdf.
127 Matthew Lee, “Another record poppy crop in Afghanistan,”
Associated Press, August 4, 2007, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070804/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/ us_afghanistan.
128 Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War, 40, 100.
129 Scott, Road to 9/11, 166-67.
130 Scott, War Conspiracy, 51-78, 111-50.
There are other instances of such recurrences in the book, some of them multiple
recurrences.